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The blockchain cannot be described just as a revolution. It is a
tsunami-like phenomenon, slowly advancing and gradually envel
oping everything along its way by the force of its progression.1

I. Introduction
Blockchain is a ten-year-old technology inducing massive changes in
industries all over the world.2 It fills many niches in high-tech firms, paving the
* J.D. Candidate, University of Wyoming College of Law, Class of 2020. I would like to
thank the hard-working members of the Blockchain Coalition and the Blockchain Task Force for
their valuable insight on this topic. I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to Catherine
DiSanto Rust, Kaylee Harmon, and David Roberts for their thoughtful edits and patience through
the process. Most of all, I would like to thank my family for their steadfast support.
the

1
William Mougayar, The Business Blockchain: Promise, Practice, and Application of
Next Internet Technology 17 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. eds., 2016).

2
See Alan Cohn et al., Smart After All: Blockchain, Smart Contracts, Parametric Insurance,
and Smart Energy Grids, 1 Geo. L. Tech. Rev. 273, 274 (2017); John R. Storino et al., Decrypting
the Ethical Implications of Blockchain Technology, Legaltech News 1, 1 (Nov. 13, 2017), https://
jenner.com/system/assets/publications/17556/original/Storino%20Steffen%20Gordon%20
LegalTech%20Nov%2013%202017.pdf.
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way for better record-keeping and maintenance of insurance policies, contracts,
financial ledgers, and more.3 The legal industry has also found ways to implement
blockchain technology as it serves as a medium for “smart contracts”—contracts
that self-execute once the parties meet agreed-upon conditions.4 Under prior
frameworks, smart contracts merely simplified traditional contract execution, but
the unprecedented incorporation of blockchain technology into legal contracts
generates many new questions about the application of existing legal doctrines.5
Wyoming has been at the forefront of proactively addressing many of
these questions.6 In 2018, the Wyoming State Legislature passed blockchain
legislation.7 As a result, many blockchain companies expressed interest to local
business people about incorporating in the state.8 With the addition of block
chain technology in Wyoming, it is crucial to address the potential challenges,
especially how users are to apply existing legal doctrines to new tools that operate
using blockchain technology.9
This Comment examines the innovative legal qualities of blockchain smart
contracts and their corresponding challenges.10 Part II provides a brief background
on blockchain technology and Wyoming’s role in regulating the new tech
nology.11 Part III discusses the evolution of smart contracts and their adaptation

3

See Cohn et al., supra note 2, at 273, 277– 80, 290 –92.

See Pierluigi Cuccuru, Beyond Bitcoin: An Early Overview on Smart Contracts, 25 Int’l J. L.
& Info. Tech. 179, 184 – 86 (2017).
4

5
See Max Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 Geo. L. Tech. Rev. 305,
306 (2017).
6
See Margaret I. Lyle et al., State Laws Addressing Blockchain Technology, in Blockchain
Business Lawyers, 185, 187–92 (James A. Cox & Mark W. Rasmussen, eds., 2018)
(providing background information on other national leaders, including Arizona, Delaware, and
Vermont); Benjamin Bain, Wyoming Aims to be America’s Cryptocurrency Capital, Bloomberg
B usinessweek , (May 15, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-15/
wyoming-aims-to-be-america-s-cryptocurrency-capital.

for

7
During its 2018 Budget Session, the Wyoming State Legislature passed five bills, now
codified into law. See Wyo. Stat. Ann §§ 17-4-102, -206, 17-16-140 to -142, -626, -720, -724,
-730, -1601, 17-29-21, 39-11-105, 40-22-102, -104. -126, 44-22-104 (2018).
8
See Bain, supra note 6. For example, David Pope, an accountant and Executive Director
of Wyoming Blockchain Coalition, was contacted by over a dozen blockchain companies looking
to register in the state. Id. James Row, a registered broker for more than two decades who worked
with the Wyoming Blockchain Coalition, filed paperwork for a new blockchain finance company
in Wyoming immediately after the law changed. Id. Row is considering moving at least a few of his
eleven other businesses currently registered in Delaware to Wyoming, including some in finance and
energy. Id.

See James A. Cox, Introduction to Blockchain Technology, in Blockchain
Lawyers, supra note 6, at 1.
9

10

See infra notes 150 –239 and accompanying text.

11

See infra notes 18–56 and accompanying text.
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to blockchain technology.12 This section further introduces some of the benefits
and drawbacks of smart contracts.13 Part IV provides an in-depth analysis of the
legal issues that will likely arise with this new form of contract, including the
application of traditional contract law principles, the potential for unauthorized
practice of law, jurisdictional challenges in drafting and enforcing smart contracts,
and concerns regarding the potential liability for errors in smart contracts.14 Part
V briefly examines Wyoming’s recent legislation and assesses potential future
regulation of smart contracts.15 This section concludes by recommending that
the Wyoming Legislature (Legislature) pass a legislative finding to show that
Wyoming’s existing legal structure already consents to the use of smart contracts.16
The recommendation also urges the Legislature to refrain from passing specific
legislation that would restrict the industry before it creates its own standards and
before the courts speak to the enforceability of smart contracts.17

II. Background
A. What is Blockchain?
Cryptocurrency is a “digital currency in which encryption techniques are
used to regulate the generation of units of currency and verify the transfer of
funds, and which operate independently of a central bank.”18 Blockchain is the
trading medium of cryptocurrency, the most popular being Bitcoin.19 Satoshi
Nakamoto, a pseudonymous and publicly-unknown author, created Bitcoin.20
Mr. Nakamoto introduced cryptocurrency in 2008, along with the platform
on which it operates, known today as blockchain technology.21 Blockchain
12

See infra notes 57–149 and accompanying text.

13

See infra notes 90 –125 and accompanying text.

14

See infra notes 150–239 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 240–76 and accompanying text. This Legislature should draft a finding
similar to the finding in the Legislature’s Working Draft that noted “the legislature finds the
following . . . . .” See Working Draft Version 5, Act Relating to Smart Contracts, S.F., 65th Leg.,
Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2019) (Blockchain Task Force Interim Committee Working Draft, 19LSO-0049),
https://www.wyoleg.gov/InterimCommittee/2018/S3-20180924SmartContractsDraftBill[19LSO0049v.0.5].pdf [hereinafter Working Draft Version 5, 19LSO-0049].
15

16

See infra notes 260– 62 and accompanying text.

17

See infra notes 267–76 and accompanying text.

18

W. Va. Code § 61-15-1(3) (2018).

See Tsui S. Ng, Blockchain and Beyond: Smart Contracts, A.B.A. Bus. L. Today (Sept.
2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2017/09/09_ng.html.
Although a deep examination of cryptocurrency is beyond the scope of this Comment, a brief
overview of the emerging technology is provided for background. See infra notes 21–25 and
accompanying text. For a more in-depth discussion of cryptocurrency, see Satoshi Nakamoto,
Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, 1– 8 (2008), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
19

20

Cox, supra note 9, at 1–2.

21

Id.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2019

3

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 19 [2019], No. 1, Art. 7

90

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 19

technology commenced as a means of operating cryptocurrency transactions.22
A cryptocurrency blockchain encodes debits and credits to cryptocurrency
accounts and stores them as transactions “in blocks.”23 Contrary to centralized
record-keeping systems, each node in the system evaluates the transaction
and maintains its own ledger of all transactions in a decentralized form.24 The
decentralized ledger system reduces the risk of hacking and altering information,
since a majority of the nodes must verify a change in data for the ledger to
legitimatize the alteration.25
Beyond cryptocurrency, dozens of industries use blockchain because of
its potential to revolutionize day-to-day activities and record-keeping.26 The
decentralized blockchain ledger allows multiple nodes to keep identical records
of given transactions.27 This decentralized record-keeping system creates a system
of extreme transparency that eliminates the need for a third party, solves doublespending problems, and is more resistant to hackers.28 Businesses use blockchain
ledgers to track and maintain financial records, insurance claims, or unambiguous
contracts.29 Media and entertainment companies might benefit from a blockchain ledger used to reduce online music theft and ticket fraud.30 Implementation
of blockchain will improve travel efficiency and reduce duplicity for travel
agencies.31 Blockchain also has potential to transform the healthcare industry by
capturing clinical data more efficiently.32

22

See Raskin, supra note 5, at 317.

23

See id. at 318.

See, e.g., J. Travis Laster & Marcel T. Rosner, Distributed Stock Ledgers and Delaware Law,
73 Bus. L. 319, 321 (2018) (defining a node as a computer on the network which keeps its own
copy of the ledger.); Cox, supra note 9, at 2, 6.
24

Laster & Rosner, supra note 24, at 325 (explaining how the peer-to-peer system comprised
of nodes makes the blockchain reliable and secure); see Raskin, supra note 5, at 318 (“A block is
verified by a large number of computers in a network, called nodes, and then tacked on to the
previously verified blocks. This chain of data blocks is known as a blockchain.”).
25

26

See infra notes 29–32 and accompanying text.

27

See Storino et al, supra note 2, at 1–2.

28

See Cox, supra note 9, at 2.

See Rewire Your Industry with IBM Blockchain, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/blockchain/
industries (last visited Nov. 12, 2018).
29

See Now Playing: Transparency in Media, Entertainment and Advertising with IBM
Blockchain, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/blockchain/industries/advertising-media (last visited Nov.
12, 2018).
30

See Move Your Transportation Operations Ahead with IBM Blockchain Solutions, IBM,
https://www-01.ibm.com/common/ssi/cgi-bin/ssialias?htmlfid=48015248USEN& (last visited
Nov. 12, 2018).
31

Devon S. Connor-Green, Blockchain in Healthcare Data, 21 U.S.F. Intell. Prop. & Tech
L. J. 93, 98 (2017).
32
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Because of its novelty, courts are still in the beginning stages of adjudicating
blockchain and the various tools that operate using the new technology.33 Since
blockchain is still emerging in the legal world, state legislatures hold a paramount
task of drafting and enacting new legislation that will offer the courts guidance
on how to treat blockchain.34 States are making policy choices in hopes of
attracting economic growth by creating a competitive edge in drawing business
over competing states.35 Though many states are setting new policies, there has
yet to be a consensus on the right way to regulate the modern technology.36 Many
states, including Wyoming, have created blockchain task forces and initiatives to
explore how blockchain can help spur economic development.37

B. Blockchain’s Importance to Wyoming
Many recognize Wyoming as an illustrious state to start a new enterprise
because of its low taxes and corporate-friendly laws.38 As the first state to recognize
limited liability companies, Wyoming has long enjoyed a reputation as a state
attentive to business needs.39 Wyoming’s capability for accommodating blockchain
technology is no concession to its other business incentives.40 In addition to
having a business-minded environment, Wyoming ranks high in the nation for

33
Many cases that discuss blockchain technology are specifically concerned with companies
that operate with cryptocurrency, fighting for trademark rights and injunctions against similar
companies. See Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd. v. Alibabacoin Found., No. 18-CV-2897 (JPO), 2018
WL 2022626, at 7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2018); Telegram Messenger, Inc. v. Lantah, LLC, No. 18-cv02811 (CRB), 2018 WL 3753748, at 2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2018). Some of these courts are left with
equivocal options for how to treat virtual currency until Congress speaks on the matter. See, e.g.,
CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 220 –21 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
34
To date, a search in Lexis reveals eight states have codified legislation relating to blockchain
legislation in hopes to clear up ambiguities: Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, Ohio, Tennessee,
Vermont, and Wyoming. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9-500.42 (2018); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 719.045 (2017); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-10-201 (2018); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1913 (2018).
35

Lyle et al., supra note 6, at 185.

See id. at 185– 86. Wyoming, Arizona, and Delaware have embraced the opportunity for
economic growth by enacting legislation that intends to attract blockchain technology. Id. On the
other hand, New York, has enacted heavy regulatory requirements on virtual currency that create a
strong compliance component. Id. Meanwhile, many states have been completely silent on the issue
altogether; for example, California passed “wait-and-see” legislation. Id.
36

37
See id. at 202 –13 (explaining how Delaware, Illinois, Vermont, Arizona, and Wyoming
have all created some form of an initiative or task force, or both).
38

See Matthew D. Kaufman et al., Crowdfunding Comes to Wyoming, Wyo. Law., Aug. 2017,

39

Id.

at 44.
See generally Arno Rosenfeld & Heather Richards, Can Blockchain Save Wyoming? Why the
Cowboy State is Banking Big on the Technology, Casper Star Trib. (Apr. 25, 2018), https://trib.com/
business/can-blockchain-save-wyoming-why-the-cowboy-state-is-banking/article_20b361fc-06ff5970-9843-5ccbdc39d5f3.html; Bain, supra note 6.
40
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energy production.41 Availability of affordable energy is a critical consideration
for blockchain companies, as transactions using blockchain require high levels
of energy.42 There are also energy companies in Wyoming willing to implement
different blockchain pricing structures in an attempt to attract blockchain entities
to Wyoming.43
Enacting regulatory legislation will incentivize companies who use
blockchain technology to incorporate in Wyoming.44 Though a new regulatory
structure might propel some companies to incorporate in the state without a
physical presence, policymakers are confident “registration and filing fees alone
[will] bring loads of fresh cash into the state.”45 But records indicate that many
blockchain companies are already choosing Wyoming as their physical domicile.46

41
Wyoming State Profile and Energy Estimates, U.S. Energy Info. Admin. (2017), https://www.
eia.gov/state/?sid=WY#tabs-3 (showing Wyoming as a primary source of various types of energy).

See Adam J. Kolber, Not-So-Smart Blockchain Contracts and Artificial Responsibility,
21 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 198, 228 (2018) (explaining how one bitcoin transaction uses enough
energy to heat 1.57 American homes for an entire day); Chrissy Suttles, Black Hills Applies for New
Blockchain Energy Pricing, Wyo. Trib. Eagle (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.wyomingnews.com/news/
local_news/black-hills-applies-for-new-blockchain-energy-pricing-options/article_274446dacabe-11e8-af19-770097f0a7f4.html (explaining how blockchain companies are looking for lowcost energy).
42

43

See Suttles, supra note 42.

See, e.g., Bain, supra note 6 (explaining how Charles Dusek, co-founder of Node Haven,
a startup hoping to raise as much as $50 million in an initial coin offering, registered in Wyoming
in mid-April to take advantage of the new tax incentives); Rosenfeld & Richards, supra note 40
(explaining how Wyoming should provide a beneficial regulatory environment to blockchain
companies to see growth in the state).
44

45

Bain, supra note 6.

See Daniel Bendsten, Tech Companies Promise Wyoming Investment at ‘Hackathon’, Casper
Star Trib. (Sept. 11, 2018), https://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/tech-companies-promisewyoming-investment-at-hackathon/article_17dd1507-3e14-5ea7-b4d5-2d1fb761bb03.html
(explaining how, at the Wyoming’s first WyoHackathon hosted by the University of Wyoming,
several blockchain companies announced plans to move to Wyoming). These announcements came
from the founder of ActiveAether, a New York-based company who plans to relocate to Jackson Hole,
Wyoming, and the founder of Overstock.com, who has plans to open a blockchain development
office in the state. Id.; see also generally Michael del Castillo, Free-Range Beef Bound by the Blockchain,
Forbes (May 17, 2018, 11:48 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeldelcastillo/2018/05/17/
free-range-beef-bound-by-the-blockchain/ (explaining how Wyoming Senator Ogden Driskill
joined startup BeefChain, which provides for the tracking of livestock so that the owners of the
livestock can sell for a higher resale price that reflects their true natural, free range lifestyle). As
of the date of this Comment, BeefChain works with five Wyoming ranches who plan to track
their livestock using blockchain technology. BeefChain, https://beefchain.com/ranches/ (last
visited Nov. 13, 2018). BeefChain incorporated in Wyoming in July 2018 as a limited liability
company, and lists its principal business location as Cheyenne, Wyoming. See Wyo. Secretary
of St., BeefChain, LLC Filing (July 18, 2018), https://wyobiz.wy.gov/business/FilingDetails.
aspx?eFNum=132016026062029145255250095101151085094016079240.
46
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Policymakers believe Wyoming’s prosperity in this lucrative market hinges on the
regulatory environment it provides.47
Aside from enacting blockchain-related legislation, Wyoming has been
proactive in inviting blockchain technology to the state in other ways.48
Wyoming organized a Blockchain Coalition (Coalition) to educate citizens about
blockchain and spur new business in Wyoming using the technology.49 The
Coalition consists of advisors throughout the state with an interest in inviting
blockchain companies to Wyoming, and emphasizes the opportunity Wyoming
has to foster a blockchain-friendly environment.50 The Coalition also illustrates
specific ways in which Wyoming can use blockchain technology: ranchers and
coal producers can certify Wyoming products with ease, healthcare industries
can reduce costs by utilizing better data tracking, holders of mineral rights and
leases can better track their royalties and severance payments, the government can
have easier accessibility of documents and automatic compliance with publicrecords retention laws, and campaign managers can better show financial
transparency of candidates.51
The Wyoming Legislature also formed a Blockchain Task Force (Task Force)
to determine the best way to regulate the blockchain industry in the state.52 It is
the responsibility of this Task Force to introduce blockchain-related bills for the
Legislature’s consideration.53 The Task Force advanced five bills during the 2018

47

See Rosenfeld & Richards, supra note 40.

48

See Lyle et al., supra note 6, at 185, 189–90.

About Us, Wyo. Blockchain Coalition, http://wyomingblockchain.io/about (last visited
Nov. 13 , 2018) (“The mission of the Wyoming Blockchain Coalition is to educate Wyoming
citizens about the power of blockchain technology to cut costs, streamline administrative processes
and spur entirely new businesses in Wyoming”).
49

50
Id.; Telephone Interview with David Pope, Principal Officer of DACPA, Executive Direc
tor of Wyoming Blockchain Coalition (Oct. 11, 2018) (explaining how the Coalition’s goal is to
create a block of legislative initiatives that will do more than increase the number of registrations in
the state, such as “creat[ing] an ecosystem where the capital that [comes] into the state [will] stay in
the state and be utilized within the state”).
51
Blockchain 101, Wyo. Blockchain Coalition, http://wyomingblockchain.io/blockchain101/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2018).

John Spina, Task Force Setup to Study Cryptocurrency in Wyoming, Wyo. Trib. Eagle (June
2, 2018) https://www.wyomingnews.com/news/task-force-setup-to-study-cryptocurrency-inwyoming/article_10f0e5b0-65c3-11e8-a3e8-ab78b1e71b64.html. See generally 2018 Blockchain
Task Force, S t . W yo . L egis ., http://www.wyoleg.gov/Committees/2018/S3 (last visited Nov.
13, 2018) (stating that the Task Force is a legislative committee comprised of two state senators
appointed by the Senate President, two state representatives appointed by the Speaker of the House,
and three non-legislative members appointed by the Governor).
52

53

See Spina, supra note 52.
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Legislative Session, all of which passed.54 The implementation of blockchainrelated legislation forged a competitive advantage and created a regulatory model
for other jurisdictions, as some of the legislation was the first of its kind.55 This
new legislation presents Wyoming with an opportunity to regulate blockchain
technology in a way that can directly influence how those technologies operate in
other states around the country.56

III. Smart Contracts
A. Smart Contracts Before Blockchain
A smart contract is “a set of promises, specified in digital form, including
protocols within which the parties perform on these promises.”57 Smart contracts
self-execute upon the triggering of pre-determined conditions.58 A simple vending
machine illustrates how a smart contract operates.59 A vending machine takes
in coins and, using a simple mechanism, accurately dispenses the appropriate
product and change.60 Importantly, a party cannot stop the transaction before the
vending machine executes the contract completely.61 The machine cannot return
the money once it supplies the product because the software of the machine
embeds the terms of the transaction.62 A smart contract operates in a similar
manner: once the software determines that the parties have met the requisite
conditions, it automatically executes the contract, acting as a third party, similar
to an escrow agent.63
54
See H.B. 19, 70, 101, 126, 64th Leg., Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2018); S.F. 111, 64th Leg.,
Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2018) (codified at scattered sections of Wyo. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, §§ 40-22-102
to 110, 39-11-105 (2018)). See also supra note 7 and accompanying text.

See Rachel Wolfson, U.S. State of Wyoming Defines Cryptocurrency ‘Utility Tokens’ As New
Asset Class, Forbes (Mar 13, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rachelwolfson/2018/03/13/u-sstate-of-wyoming-defines-cryptocurrency-utility-tokens-as-new-asset-class/#12b41eda4816 (“It’s
very exciting that Wyoming is the first state to define what a utility token is, setting an example of
how this could become a standard under federal law. I do believe the Wyoming approach will work
under federal securities law and am optimistic the SEC will agree.”).
55

See Lyle et al., supra note 6, at 186. “As Justice Brandeis recognized, . . . a ‘state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country.’ The current environment for blockchain and distributed ledger technology
may serve as just such a state-law laboratory.” Id. at 186 – 87.
56

57
Smart contracts commentators recognize Nick Szabo as the creator of the smart contract in
1997. Raskin, supra note 5, at 320; Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67
Duke L.J. 313, 319 (2017).
58

Werbach & Cornell, supra note 57, at 320.

59

Id. at 348.

60

Id.

61

Norton R. Fullbright, Smart Contracts: Coding the Fine Print 7 (2016).

62

Id.

See Cuccuru, supra note 4, at 185 (explaining how a smart contract imitates an
escrow arrangement).
63
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Although variations of smart contracts existed in the 1990s, lack of the
requisite technology prevented widespread implementation.64 Prior to blockchain,
smart contracts were computer programs which facilitated negotiation and verified
and enforced performance on a centralized server.65 Financial institutions used a
form of pre-blockchain smart contracts when they eased bookkeeping transactions
and option contracts by implementing computer code.66 Other examples of these
pre-blockchain smart contracts include telecom providers locking phones and
vehicle manufacturers incorporating automated speed limitations.67 General
uncertainty and concern from users, combined with issues of identity and
transaction verification ultimately hindered the use of smart contracts, however.68
Blockchain technology confronted these obstructions and has since molded the
use of smart contracts.69

B. Smart Contracts’ Evolution Post-Blockchain
Once developed, blockchain streamlined the use of smart contracts, serving
as its technological framework and providing security and accuracy.70 With this
technology, a network of nodes distributes the smart contract execution.71 This
more sophisticated execution does not depend on any third party to operate
because it is autonomous and independent.72 Consequently, contracts drafted
using blockchain are effectively tamper-proof and protect users from the possibility
of unilateral change.73
Blockchain technology serves as a decentralized ledger that records trans
actions using different nodes or computers to verify and legitimize transactions.74
Ethereum is one of the leading blockchain platforms on which smart contracts

J. Dax Hansen et al., More Legal Aspects of Smart Contract Applications 3 (2018),
https://www.perkinscoie.com/images/content/1/9/v3/199672/2018-More-Legal-Aspects-ofSmart-Contract-Applications-White-Pa.pdf.
64

Primavera De Filippi & Samer Hassan, Blockchain Technology as a Regulatory Technology:
From Code Is Law to Law Is Code, First Monday (Dec. 5, 2016), https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.
php/fm/article/view/7113/5657.
65

66

Raskin, supra note 5, at 321.

67

De Filippi & Hassan, supra note 65.

See Scott A. McKinney et al., Smart Contracts, Blockchain, and the Next Frontier of
Transactional Law, 13 Wash. J.L. Tech. & Arts 313, 317 (2018).
68

69

Werbach & Cornell, supra note 57, at 330.

Reggie O’Shields, Smart Contracts: Legal Agreements for the Blockchain, 21 N.C. Banking
Inst. 177, 179 (2017) (explaining how smart contracts provide security and accuracy); see also
Cuccuru, supra note 4, at 184.
70

71

See McKinney et al., supra note 68, at 317–18; supra note 24 and accompanying text.

72

See McKinney et al., supra note 68, at 323–25.

73

Id. at 317.

74

See supra notes 24 –25 and accompanying text.
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operate.75 Designed specifically for smart contracts, Ethereum is capable of
carrying data in the form of arguments—variables which contain data or codes—
meaning the users can program the platform to take specific action once parties
meet certain conditions.76
Coders write the terms of a smart contract in blockchain computer code
rather than in English or another traditional language.77 No individual or program can override or change the ledger.78 Once the parties meet conditions as
stated in the ledger, the contract executes automatically without interjection from
a third party.79 Smart contracts often resemble “if-then” propositions, where, if
Party A releases money into the blockchain, then the smart contract will selfexecute to meet the obligation laid out in the contract.80 Smart contracts must
collect outside information using an external data feed since smart contracts
often rely on facts outside of the blockchain to determine if parties have met
their requisite obligations.81 Oracles are the systems that interpret such external
feeds and verify contractual performance.82 Smart contracts use oracles to collect facts outside of the blockchain to help determine if the parties have met
their obligations.83
Smart contracts that operate using blockchain technology will likely have
a profound influence on various industries.84 In the legal field, smart contracts
can drastically shorten litigation settlement times and mitigate risk for the user.85
Insurance industries can increase efficiency by implementing smart contracts to
automate policy agreements.86 Governmental entities might improve processes if
they used smart contracts to manage title recordings, social services, and e-voting.87
Further, consumers and utility companies can benefit from smart contract

75

See Ng, supra note 19.

Id. For a more technical discussion on Ethereum and its capabilities, see Werbach &
Cornell, supra note 57. See also David Gould, Complete Maya Programming 469 (2003) (“An
argument to a command or procedure is simply a value given to the command or procedure as input
to perform its operation.”).
76

77

O’Shields, supra note 70, at 181.

78

See id. at 180; infra notes 110–17 and accompanying text.

79

See O’Shields, supra note 72, at 179.

80

Cohn et al., supra note 2, at 281.

81

Werbach & Cornell, supra note 57, at 336.

82

Id.

83

See id.

84

Ng, supra note 19.

85

Id.

86

Id.

87

Id.
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use in automatic bill-paying by debiting an account based on predetermined
conditions.88 In manufacturing, smart contracts can replace slow and expensive
supply chain processes.89

C. Advantages and Disadvantages of Smart Contracts
Smart contracts have numerous advantages: streamlined business opera
tions, heightened speed and efficiency in business transactions, and low-cost
enforcement of contracts.90 Smart contracts are advantageous because they force
parties to honor their original agreements.91 Smart contracts cause the risk of
a breach to be more expensive for the breaching party, nearly eliminating the
possibility of a breach.92 If the cost of litigation offsets the probable value of the
contract, ex ante performance is favorable.93 To return to the vending machine
example, “the amount in the till should be less than the cost of breaching
the mechanism,” making the cost of breach so high it serves as a deterrent.94
Avoiding breach altogether reduces the amount parties would spend to oversee
enforcement and to litigate a costly dispute.95
Smart contracts also have several disadvantages, most of which center on
uncontrollability and unregulatabilty, frequently in the form of understandability,
rigidity by code, and rigidity by decentralization.96 Commentators view
understandability as a common problem since smart contracts are most often
written in code rather than a common language.97 Consequently, the average
person cannot interpret exactly what the contract says.98 Rather, the contracting
parties are at the mercy of the coded language and the programmers who

88

See Laster & Rosner, supra note 24, at 331.

89

See Hansen et al., supra note 64, at 16–17.

90

O’Shields, supra note 70, at 183.

Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Smart Contracts and the Cost of Inflexibility, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 263,
279 (2017).
91

92
Id.; see also Nick Szabo, Formalizing and Securing Relationships of Public Networks, First
Monday (Sept. 1, 1997), http://journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/548/469 [hereinafter
Szabo, Relationships of Public Networks].
93
Raskin, supra note 5, at 312. Ex ante means “from before” or “[b]ased on assumption and
prediction, on how things appeared beforehand, rather than in hindsight.” Black’s Law Dictionary
(10th ed. 2014).
94

Szabo, Relationships of Public Networks, supra note 92.

95

Sklaroff, supra note 91, at 275.

Cuccuru, supra note 4, at 188 –92 (explaining how smart contracts show a radical shift
from natural language to code, which raises questions of understandability since the language is only
machine-readable).
96

97

Id. at 188.

98

Id.
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drafted it.99 A major question arises in coded language showing up in litigation:
whether a court can enforce codable language if the self-execution ends up in
litigation.100 Unfortunately, these questions remain unanswered, as courts have
not yet addressed an issue about the readability of code in the smart contract.101
One strategy users can employ to address these obscurities is to carefully draft
the smart contract to address ambiguities ex ante.102 Though this meticulous
drafting will mitigate considerable uncertainties between contracting parties, it is
difficult for parties to reduce the entirety of their agreement to fully-defined terms
ex ante.103
Another major difficulty of smart contracts for those who intend to contract
with flexible terms is the rigidity that code possesses.104 Parties are often willing
to include discretionary contract terms for greater flexibility upon execution.105
Smart contracts limit the parties’ discretion because the automated system selfexecutes the contract.106 The blockchain will automatically execute once parties
meet the definitive conditions.107 Because the coding of the smart contract on the
blockchain cannot deal with vague or uncertain conditions, smart contracts are
more practical when used with concrete rather than abstract conditions.108 Smart
contracts generally do not accommodate flexibility and, as a result, are unlikely to
replace contracts that necessitate or contain flexible terms.109
Smart contracts possess a high level of immutability, which can serve as a
hindrance.110 As explained previously, the decentralized nature of its transactional
ledger is a strong advantage of blockchain.111 But this decentralization also has
99
100

Id.
Id. at 189.

See Rensel v. Centra Tech, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-24500, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100720, (S.D.
Fla. Dec. 12, 2017). In Rensel, a Federal Magistrate for the Southern District of Florida accepted a
definition of “smart contract,” as “self-executing contracts with the terms of the agreement between
buyer and seller being directly written into lines of code. Once a smart contract has been created,
computer transaction protocols will execute the terms of a contract automatically based on a set of
conditions.” Id. at 26. However, the parties did not dispute the smart contract’s enforceability. Id. at
5–6.
101

102

See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 57, at 359, 374.

103

Sklaroff, supra note 91, at 280.

104

See Cuccuru, supra note 4, at 189 –90.

105

See id.

106

Id.

107

See id.

108

See id.

109

See id.

See Dickson C. Chin, Smart Code and Smart Contracts, in Blockchain
Lawyers, supra note 6, at 110.
110

111

for

Business

See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
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drawbacks—the largest being the lack of opportunity for parties to modify once
the smart contract executes.112 The perpetual nature of this technology creates
particular concern if the parties mutually agree to alter or reverse the contract.113
Because of the decentralization feature of the smart contract, users cannot
change the smart code once they insert it onto the blockchain.114 However, this
immutability does not mean the parties are completely without recourse.115 The
parties can include a self-destruct feature in the smart code, which will delete the
language from the block if the precise address on the blockchain calls for it.116
While the smart contract can terminate itself, the ability to exercise these actions
requires careful planning and drafting.117
Hesitant commentators of smart contracts also question the possibility of
impeding the execution of a smart contract which a party or third party realizes
is fraudulent or illegal.118 For example, if a smart contract properly executes and
releases access keys to pornographic material online, it is unclear what recourse
is available.119 Whether law enforcement or another authority has the ability to
stop the automatic trade is unclear. Currently, software developers are trialing
prototypes of “permissioned” or private blockchains—hybrid blockchains which
address this issue.120 As the technology develops, rigidity appears less of an issue
since the use of recent, more regulated blockchain technology can allow for
human intervention to prevent fraudulent or illegal uses of smart contracts.121
Blockchain services are likely to remain somewhat uncontrollable, especially
with the stronger presence of smart contracts.122 However, there is a strong
advantage in the parties’ inability to intervene in smart contracts.123 With a smart
contract, human intervention is not necessary.124 When courts and authorities

112

See Cuccuru, supra note 4, at 190.

113

See Chin, supra note 110, at 110.

114

Id. at 111.

115

See id.

Id. (explaining how agreements can also require additional conditions to approve a
termination). See also generally Introduction to Smart Contracts, Solidity, https://solidity.readthe
docs.io/en/v0.4.25/introduction-to-smart-contracts.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2014) (explaining
how the only way to remove code from the blockchain is by way of the self-destruct feature).
116

117

See Chin, supra note 110, at 112.

118

See Cuccuru, supra note 4, at 191.

119

Id.

120

Id. at 192.

121

See id.

122

See id.

123

See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.

124

See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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require human intervention to moderate challenges of enforcement, it lessens the
anticipated utility of smart contracts.125

D. Smart Contract Examples
In consumer transactions, the use of smart contracts as purchasing agents
puts consumers on a more even playing field with those in positions with higher
bargaining power, such as corporations.126 A consumer can use a smart contract
to negotiate an online transaction with a vendor, creating a situation where smart
contracts exchange with each other on behalf of their principals.127 One example
of a consumer transaction utilizing a smart contract is a car lease:
Suppose that Bob has a fleet of cars, one of which he wants to
lease to Alice. Further suppose that in this world, cars can be
operated by a digitally-enabled “key” such as a smartphone app,
QR code, or fingerprint, which can be activated and terminated
remotely. According to the smart contract, Alice provides down
payment to Bob in exchange for use of his car for a set amount
of time. Both Alice and Bob have pre-specified a bargaining
logic based on their desired terms, such as lease length, interest
rate, size of down payment, and car specification. Bob runs a
blockchain program that monitors his accounts and inventory,
analyzes Alice’s proposed terms, and then autonomously
negotiates terms acceptable to both. Alice runs a similar
blockchain program that monitors her personal accounts to
ensure sufficient funds to pay for the lease. Both applications are
authorized to bargain and enter into a smart contract for their
respective owners. Once the agreement is formed, Bob’s smart
contract discovers Alice’s payment, chooses a car that matches
her desired specifications, and instructs that car to accept her
digital key.128
A more multifaceted example is the smart contract to buy or sell stocks when
a price reaches a certain threshold.129 Not only can a smart contract be told to
execute once a price reaches a certain level, it can also contract to execute only
Cuccuru, supra note 4, at 192 (explaining how increasing external control over smart
contracts downplays the advantages of a decentralized ledger); see also O’Shields, supra note 70, at
190 (“The central idea of a smart contract is that it is self-executing and eliminates the need to resort
to human intervention, so some of these challenges in enforcement may reduce the prospective
benefits of smart contracts.”).
125

126

O’Shields, supra note 70, at 182.

127

See id. at 182– 83.

128

Sklaroff, supra note 91, at 273–74.

129

Cuccuru, supra note 4, at 185.
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if parties meet regulatory compliance conditions.130 In a corporate setting, stock
ledgers with blockchain capability can also benefit from a smart contract.131
Coders can program features of a stock ledger into the smart contract before a
corporation releases additional shares.132 These features can differentiate between
voting rights, payment rights, and other features.133 If the corporation decides
to issue more shares, the smart contract can require the stock ledger to hold the
corporation from issuing shares until it achieves the mandatory vote.134
Another instance of smart contracting is an insurance claim.135 Insurance
claims take weeks, sometimes months, to process due to the requirement of human
“involvement.”136 This requirement adds administrative cost and oftentimes
litigation expense.137 When an insurance company writes its policies in the form
of a smart contract, the input conditions change in the case of an insured event.138
In the event of a hurricane or other natural disaster, an oracle can input data
such as wind speed, location of a hurricane, or magnitude of an earthquake onto
the blockchain.139 If and when those parameters meet or exceed the pre-arranged
limits, the smart contract automatically triggers the claims process and delivers
the exact amount of financial payout without human involvement.140
In the modern industry of sports management, athletes utilize traditional
contracts and oftentimes employ sports agents to represent their interests in the
drafting and contracting process.141 Commonly, though, the use of these agents
results in additional time and expense, excessive fee charging, and inadequate
representation.142 The incorporation of smart contracts into the sports industry
will both simplify the contract-drafting process and result in fewer contract
disputes.143 For instance, employment contracts for professional athletes usually

130
See Christina Batog, Blockchain: A Proposal to Reform High Frequency Trading Regulation, 33
Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 739, 759 (2015).
131

Laster & Rosner, supra note 24, at 331.

132

Id.

133

Id.

134

Id.

Smart Contracts Application Examples and Use Cases, Draglet, https://www.draglet.com/
blockchain-services/smart-contracts/use-cases/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
135

136

Id.

137

See id.

138

Id.

139

Id.

140

Id.

Joshua Bernstein, Smart Contract Integration in Professional Sports Management: The
Imminence of Athlete Representation, 14 DePaul J. Sports L. 88, 94 (2018).
141

142

Id. at 93.

143

Id. at 95.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2019

15

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 19 [2019], No. 1, Art. 7

102

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 19

require athletes to adhere to conditions associated with making appearances at
corporate events and endorsing certain products.144 These conditions repeatedly
lead to disputes about a player not attending a required event, ending in a
sponsor suing for breach of contract.145 With the use of a smart contract, parties
can set the number of appearances, time of appearance, payment amount, and
endorsements as predetermined conditions that, if met, require payment to the
player.146 The satisfying conditions can combine GPS location information, timestamps, or social media appearances.147 The oracle can then comb the internet
and verify the data to a level of certainty agreed to in the contract.148 If the player
fails to show up to the required event or fails to meet another requisite condition,
the smart contract will not execute and, will therefore not trigger the payment to
the player.149

IV. Legal Issues With Smart Contracts
A. Application Under Traditional Contract Law
Because of the uniqueness and complexity inherent in smart contracts, it
is difficult to discern where and how they fit within the legal frameworks of
traditional contract law.150 Courts and policymakers thus far have not assessed
the full potential of smart contracts, making it difficult to place them within
a regulatory scheme.151 As of yet, no court has provided guidance for the
enforceability of smart contracts, nor has there been a smart contract market

John Southurst, E-Rugby Star: Smart Contracts Could Prevent Legal Disputes in Sports,
(Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.coindesk.com/ex-rugby-star-smart-contracts-prevent-legaldisputes-sport/.
144

coindesk
145

Id.

146

See id.

147

Id.

Id. The idea of oracles combing the internet for verifiable data does raise a host of privacy
concerns, as do many other new blockchain operations. Adam Waks, Blockchain and Privacy, Nat’l
L. Rev, (Dec. 2017) https://www.natlawreview.com/article/blockchain-and-privacy. For a more
in-depth discussion on such concerns, see id. However, some commentators note that privacy
concerns will lessen once the novelty of the latest technology wears off. See, e.g., Jerry Brito et al.,
Bitcoin Financial Regulation: Securities, Derivatives, Prediction Markets, and Gambling, 16 Colum.
Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 144, 220 (2014); infra notes 82– 83 and accompanying text.
148

149

See Southhurst, supra note 144.

See Trevor I. Kiviat, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating Blockchain Transactions, 65 Duke
L.J. 569, 607 (2016).
150

151
Jakub J. Szczerbowski, Place of Smart Contracts in Civil Law. A Few Comments on Form and
Interpretation, in Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Scientific Conference: New
Trends 2017, at 335 (Priv. C. of Econ. Stud. Znojmo ed., 2017), available at https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3095933 (follow “Open PDF in Browser” hyperlink).
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with standardized practices established.152 The absence of authority and direction
causes conflicting views about the enforceability of smart contracts.153
Some analysts characterize smart contracts as an alternative to legally
enforceable contracts.154 The presumption in this analysis is that the contracts
are not legally enforceable because, once the parties activate the smart contract,
the parties have no entitlements beyond those written in code.155 The code
executes robotically without any consideration of other factors.156 Proponents of
this analysis believe that the smart contract does not create obligations in the
legal meaning of a contractual obligation.157 This theory claims that smart
contracts are developing in a technical universe not yet touched by the legal realm,
similar to the early stages of the Internet.158 This analysis falls short, because it is
unlikely courts and legislatures will allow smart contracts to be out of the reach
of the law.159
Traditional contracts implicate future performance by creating an obligation
for one or more parties.160 Smart contracts do not create a future obligation, as
neither party is legally obligated to take any action after they form the contract.161
For example, if parties form a smart contract that requires an airline to send its
escrowed cryptocurrency to a customer if the airline delays the customer’s flight,
neither party has a future obligation to act after formation.162 If the airline delays
the flight, the smart contract will self-execute and send the escrowed money to the
party who experienced a delayed flight.163
Others contend that smart contracts simply fit into the existing legal doc
trines that govern traditional contract law.164 These proponents believe that the
152

McKinney et al., supra note 68, at 325.

Compare Raskin, supra note 5, at 322 (arguing that smart contracts are straightforward and
governed by traditional contract law), with Werbach & Cornell, supra note 57, at 367 (articulating
that smart contracts are so succinctly different from traditional contracts that we cannot view them
as contracts).
153

154
Stephen M. McJohn & Ian McJohn, The Commercial Law of Bitcoin and Blockchain
Transactions, 47 Unif. Com. Code L.J. 187 (forthcoming July 2017).
155

Id.

156

Id.

See Alexander Savelyev, Contract Law 2.0: Smart Contracts as the Beginning of the End of
Classic Contract Law, 26 Info. & Comm. L. 116, 128 (2017).
157

158

Id. at 16.

159

See Raskin, supra note 5, at 340

160

Kolber, supra note 42, at 221.

161

See id.

162

See id.

163

See id.

164

See Raskin, supra note 5, at 340.
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new form of contracts is best analyzed under traditional contract law until more
smart contract-specific guidance develops.165 Through this lens, a smart contract
fulfills the offer requirement through a posting on the blockchain ledger which
occurs in an effort to elicit acceptance.166 Acceptance and consideration are both
confirmed through the act of performance of the self-executing smart contract.167
If the contract executes, it meets the requisite elements of offer, acceptance,
and consideration; if the contract does not execute, there is no legally binding
contract, only an offer.168 Since the smart contract outlines the obligations that
it automatically triggers, this theory proposes that smart contracts do not require
external interpretation and intervention.169 Additionally, these proponents
generally trust that users intend smart contracts for simplistic transactions that do
not compel a high level of flexibility.170
The analysis that recognizes smart contracts strictly under traditional contract
law is stronger than the assertion that smart contracts are not legally binding for
two reasons.171 First, this analysis recognizes that a smart contract can be analo
gous to a traditional contract.172 Second, it recognizes the opportunity to legally
enforce smart contracts absent new regulations.173 However, this theory also limits
the potential future use of smart contracts by assuming all smart contracts ought
to operate like traditional contracts.174
Because of the varying treatment of smart contracts and their legal
status, a more legally sound suggestion is to enact regulations specific to smart
contracts by means of the coding language used to draft smart contracts
themselves.175 Due to their complex nature, smart contracts require more
technical regulation than those currently in place.176 But instead of policymakers

McKinney et al., supra note 68, at 325–26 (explaining how traditional principles of
formation, execution, and enforcement apply to smart contracts).
165

See Paul Catchlove, Smart Contracts: A New Era of Contract Use 10 (Dec. 1, 2017)
(unpublished independent research paper, Queensland University of Technology, Faculty of Law),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3090226 (follow “Open PDF in Browser” hyperlink).
166

167

See id. at 11.

168

See id. at 11–12.

169

See id.

170

McKinney et al., supra note 68, at 329.

171

See infra notes 172–73 and accompanying text.

172

See Raskin, supra note 5, at 322.

173

See id. at 306.

See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 57, at 348 (“The distinctive aspect of smart contracts
is not that they make enforcement easier, it is that they make enforcement unavoidable. In order to
do so, they change the nature of the contract itself.”).
174

175

See De Filippi & Hassan, supra note 65.

176

See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 57, at 377.
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writing the regulation, software builders and device producers should express
this regulation in the code language they draft, progressively turning law into
code.177 Regulatory code would proclaim blockchain as a type of regulatory
technology—“a technology that can be used both to define and incorporate
legal or contractual provisions into code, and to enforce them irrespectively of
whether or not there subsists an underlying legal rule.”178 These technical rules
can ensure a court will enforce any smart contract on its technical credibility
rather than whether it meets the requirements of a valid contract under the law.179
The coded rules omit the possibility that legal safeguards might invalidate the
contract as a result of failure to comply with specific formalities.180
In the last several years, the idea of regulation through code has gained
broad interest among analysts, though not all agree with it.181 Opponents worry
about the ramifications of using blockchain code to assume conventional legal
procedures.182 Similarly, some worry about the overall elimination of a democratic
debate, a task necessary for the legislative branch.183 To mitigate these concerns,
proponents suggest coding existing law into smart contracts.184 Coders can insert
law into a smart contract as parameters that would require the smart contracts
to follow existing law in order to execute.185 This idea of “regulatory coding”
provides additional regulatory certainty and lowers the costs of supervision and
enforcement.186 Regardless of what technical specialists think about the legal
standing of smart contracts, however, it is likely that the general principles of
contract law will apply to agreements memorialized in code until legislatures or
other authoritative bodies say otherwise.187

177

See De Filippi & Hassan, supra note 65.

178

Id.

179

Id.

180

See id.

See Jamil Khan, Comment, To What Extent Can Blockchain Be Used as a Tool for Community
Guidance, 3 Edinburgh Student L. Rev. 114, 121–22 (2017).
181

See id. at 125–26 (explaining that removing the law from smart contracts can mean
risks of accountability, transparency, and consumer protection); Usha Rodrigues, Law and the
Blockchain, 104 Iowa L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018) (showing how some commentators point to The
Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) Hack in 2016 to caution others about limits in
using the “code is law” concept).
182

183

See De Filippi & Hassan, supra note 65.

Wulf A. Kaal & Craig Calcaterra, Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution, 73 Bus. Law. 109,
140 (2017).
184

185

See id.

Id. (referring to regulatory coding as a hybrid approach that involves programming existing
legal doctrines and rules into smart contract code).
186

187

See Chin, supra note 110, at 97.
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B. Unauthorized Practice of Law
Smart contracts implicate the potential of the unauthorized practice of law.188
Legal ethics prohibit lawyers from aiding in the unauthorized practice of law.189
Some authorities have suggested that a non-attorney computer coder preparing a
will or contract, or selecting which terms to include in a legal agreement on behalf
of a party to the contract, constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.190
To determine whether smart contract drafting will create the possibility of
coders practicing law without a license, it is important to define what actions
constitute the practice of law.191 The definition of “practice of law” varies by
state.192 Wyoming has carefully defined “practice of law” and thoroughly outlines
specific authorized and unauthorized practices through the state’s court rules.193
Though Wyoming does have a statute prohibiting the unauthorized practice of
law, Wyoming case law indicates scarcity of enforcement against wrongdoers.194
Wyoming’s court system provides more guidance on the subject in the Rules
Governing the Wyoming State Bar and the Unauthorized Practice of Law.195 Rule
7 specifically authorizes the practice of law and sets out a careful definition of
what it means to practice law:
188

See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 5.5 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2015).

The American Bar Association’s Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5 restricts the
unauthorized practice of law. Id. r. 5.5(a) (“A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in
violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so.”).
189

190

Storino et al., supra note 2, at 2.

191

See id; infra note 192 and accompanying text.

See Wyo. R. Prof’l Conduct r. 5.5 cmt. 2 (2006) (“The definition of the practice of
law is established by law and varies from one jurisdiction to another.”). “Whatever the definition,
limiting the practice of law to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal
services by unqualified persons.” Id. (“This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from employing the
services of paraprofessionals and delegating functions to them, so long as the lawyer supervises
the delegated work and retains responsibility for their work. . . .”); see also Practice of law, Black’s
Law Dictionary, supra note 93 (“The professional work of a lawyer, encompassing a broad range
of services such as conducting cases in court, preparing papers necessary to bring about various
transactions from conveying land to . . . preparing legal opinions on various points of law, drafting
. . . estate-planning documents, and advising clients on legal questions.”) “The term also includes
activities that comparatively few lawyers engage in but that require legal expertise, such as drafting
legislation and court rules.” Id.
192

193

See Wyo. R. Bar. Auth. Prac. r. 7 (2018).

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-5-117 (2018) (“It shall be unlawful, and punishable as contempt of
court, for any person not a member of the Wyoming state bar to hold himself out or advertise by
whatsoever means as an attorney or counselor-at-law.”). Only a few Wyoming cases reference this
statute. See, e.g., Breen v. Pruter, 679 Fed. Appx. 713, 726 (10th Cir. 2017); Dewey Family Trust v.
Mountain West Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 3 P.3d 833, (Wyo. 2000).
194

195
See Mark W. Gifford & Jeremiah N. R. Sandburg, Overhauling Wyoming’s Unauthorized
Practice of Law System, Wyo. Law., June 2014, at 40 (“Wyoming’s UPL system dates back to 1986,
when the Wyoming Supreme Court adopted its Rules of Procedure Governing Unauthorized
Practice of Law.”).
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“Practice law” means providing any legal service for any other
person, firm or corporation, with or without compensation, or
providing professional legal advice or services where there is a
client relationship of trust or reliance, including appearing as an
advocate in a representative capacity; drafting pleadings or other
documents; or performing any act in a representative capacity
in connection with a prospective or pending proceeding before
any tribunal.196
Rule 7(c) provides for specific exemptions of activities that the rule does not
prohibit, even if the activities fit the definition provided in Rule 7(b).197 These
exemptions include allowing nonlawyer employees of financial institutions,
landmen, title insurance companies, and CPAs to conduct work within their
regular course of business without fear of violating the court rules or the statute
which prohibits the unauthorized practice of law.198
Notably, there are fifteen exemptions that apply to occupations in varying
industries.199 To circumvent the prospect of a coder practicing law by coding a
smart contract, the committee charged with adopting new rules governing the
unauthorized practice of law must recommend a new exemption to the Court to
accommodate smart contract coders.200 This exemption would be advantageous,
as it would serve as protection for smart contract coders who desire to perform
their duties without concern of practicing law without a license.201 The addition
to the rules should reflect existing exemption language by allowing licensed smart
contract coders to code contracts, but requiring the coders to stay within the
scope of coding and prohibiting them from giving legal advice regarding the legal
effect of the smart contract.202
An exemption for smart contract coders is one solution to the uncertainty
of unauthorized practice of law claims in Wyoming, though there is a sense
of hesitation in considering whether other states would allow for such an
exemption.203 If other states choose not to adopt this court rule exemption, the
rules of professional responsibility permit attorneys to assist third-parties in the
196

Wyo. R. Bar. Auth. Prac. r. 7(b).

197

Id. r. 7(c).

198

Id. r. 7(c)(1), (2), (4), (13).

199

Id.

Telephone Interview with Mark Gifford, Bar Counsel, Wyoming State Bar (Oct. 4, 2018)
(explaining how the governing committees propose rule changes to the Wyoming Supreme Court,
which becomes effective if the Court issues an order accepting the rule change).
200

201

See supra notes 188 –91 and accompanying text.

202

See supra notes 197– 98 and accompanying text.

Id. (noting the governance of unauthorized practice of law varies state-by-state, and how it
is unclear whether other states would adopt Wyoming’s approach).
203
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practice of law, such as an attorney assisting a computer coder to draft a smart
contract for a client.204 However, the rule requires a lawyer to “make reasonable
efforts to ensure that the [nonlawyer’s] conduct is compatible with the profes
sional obligations of the lawyer.”205 If parties strictly follow this rule, an attorney
would have to work closely with the computer coder to ensure the coding does
mirror the agreed-upon conditions.206 Therefore, if an attorney is not proficient
in reading or drafting code, they would be required to hire a third-party to ensure
the language reflects the agreement to avoid malpractice claims.207 While this
scenario might create a need for attorneys who specialize in smart contracts,
it also detracts from smart contracts’ appeal of shorter transactional time and
lower cost.208

C. Jurisdictional and Choice-of-Authority Challenges
Contract law varies by state and is a central focus of comparative study.209
To mitigate the dissimilar laws, courts have developed the choice of law doctrine
over time.210 This doctrine allows courts to consider the application of another
jurisdiction’s laws.211 The general rule provides that parties to a contract can
choose the applicable law that governs the contract.212 Absent an explicit term
from the contracting parties, the rule defers to local law of the state which has the
most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties.213
This choice of law provision also passes over to electronic contracts, though
not without complication.214 While most states have adopted the choice of law
doctrine as a general rule, parties can still encounter problems in an electronic
contract that does not specify the jurisdiction.215 If, in litigation, the court applies
the “most significant relationship” test which refers to the geographic locations
of discussions, performance, construction, and place of the content, the smart
204

See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 5.3 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2015).

205

Id.

206

O’Shields, supra note 70, at 193.

207

McKinney et al., supra note 68, at 334.

See McKinney et al., supra note 68, at 325 (explaining how human intervention removes
“smart” from the smart contract).
208

Mariana Pargendler, The Role of the State in Contract Law: The Common-Civil Law Divide,
43 Yale J. Int’l L. 143, 143 (2018).
209

See Aristotle G. Mirzaian, Y2K Who Cares? We Have Bigger Problems: Choice of Law in
Electronic Contracts, 6 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 20, ¶ 105 (2000).
210

211

Id. ¶ 106.

212

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 (Am. Law Inst. 1971).

213

Id.

214
See Donnie L. Kidd, Jr. & William H. Daughtrey, Jr., Adapting Contract Law to
Accommodate Electronic Contracts: Overview and Suggestions, 26 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J.
215, 272 (2000).
215

See id. at 273.
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contract might execute under laws that neither party considered due to the
extensive geographic nature of electronic transactions.216
When dealing with traditional contracts, the best practice in choosing
a governing authority is for parties to include a choice of law provision, but
this practice does not necessarily apply to smart contracts.217 The nuances
of jurisdictional authority in traditional contracts look vastly different than
those in smart contracts.218 The parties of traditional internet transactions are
usually identifiable, unlike parties using blockchain-based smart contracts that
operate on a decentralized network.219 A location for the blockchain does not
exist, making it impossible to apply traditional choice of law rules to a smart
contract in which at least one transacting party remains anonymous.220
Analysts have proposed alternatives to applying a traditional choice of law
clause to a smart contract.221 Rather than parties identifying the jurisdictional
authority, the smart contract itself can determine the most appropriate governing
authority.222 If the smart contract transacts for a piece of property, then the
jurisdiction would fall at the location of the property.223 Parties may also choose
a governing jurisdiction in a particular area where the court will apply welldeveloped legal standards.224 Eventually, there will likely be a need for specialized
courts to adjudicate smart contract disputes, similar to the specialized courts
that review patent appeal litigation.225

D. Questions of Liability
Ideally, coders write the smart contract so that it will perfectly execute the
intentions of the parties.226 But users of smart contracts should not assume
216

Id.

217

Kaal & Calcaterra, supra note 184, at 134.

218

See id. at 133.

219

Id.

220

See id.

See Gabriel Jaccard, Smart Contracts and the Role of Law, in Jusletter IT 20 (Nov. 23,
2017), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3099885 (follow “Open
PDF in Browser” hyperlink).
221

222

See id. (explaining how a jurisdiction might depend on an object in the smart contract).

223

Id.

Larry D. Wall, “Smart Contracts” in a Complex World, Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanata (July
2016), https://www.frbatlanta.org/cenfis/publications/notesfromthevault/1607 (explaining
how some financial contracts often stipulate a legal code of the United Kingdom or New York since
these jurisdictions have a reputation for predictable and fair decisions).
224

225

Chin, supra note 110, at 113 –14.

David Zaslowsky, What to Expect When Litigating Smart Contract Disputes, Law360
(Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1028009/what-to-expect-when-litigatingsmart-contract-disputes.
226
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coders writing the contract are faultless.227 Generally, enough human intervention
creates error, and humans will write the software code that informs the smart
contract of the conditions that are required to self-execute.228 A software coder
could make an error, or an operator could bug the code with a virus which
misinforms the smart contract.229 Courts have not yet had the opportunity to
resolve these liability questions, though it is likely the issues will eventually reach
the courts.230 Alternatively, a hacker could identify a vulnerability in the smart
contract and use the vulnerability for their own benefit.231 This situation already
occurred once with the first decentralized autonomous organization, which
lost over $50 million when hackers exploited a vulnerability in the code of an
investment fund.232
To avoid misallocation of liability of a smart contract, parties should allocate
risk in a prior agreement or in the smart contract itself.233 The way the parties
allocate risk will depend on whether the contracting parties or a third party
attribute to the coding error.234 This prior agreement would allow the parties to
introduce extrinsic evidence to determine the intent if there were a dispute over
the intended function of the code without the mistake.235 In this circumstance, a
court can restructure the writing to reflect the original intention of the parties.236
This proposition is analogous to traditional contract law, which supports the
court’s consideration of evidence of surrounding circumstances to determine the
parties’ intent.237 If the parties want to avoid a court allocating liability in the case
227

See id.

See id. (“[T]here is an inherent contradiction between [the] assumption [that code will
perfectly execute] and the reality that code is rarely perfect. Indeed, software engineers are not
trained to write perfect code; it is expected that bugs will be identified and fixed.”).
228

229

See id.

230

See id.

231

Id.

Rodrigues, supra note 182; see also Richard J. Johnson et al., Blockchain Technology,
Security, and Privacy, in Blockchain for Business Lawyers, supra note 6, at 120 (explaining how
the first Decentralized Autonomous Organization, launched by the Ethereum founder to serve as
an investment fund, raised $150 million before hackers exploited a vulnerability in the software,
permitting them to take $55 million worth of cryptocurrency).
232

Eliza Mik, Smart Contracts: Terminology, Technical Limitations and Real World Complexity, 9
L., Innovation & Tech. 269, 279 (2017).
233

234

Id.

See Chin, supra note 110, at 109 (noting that parties might need to rely on outside evidence
to determine intent if a dispute were to ever occur); Extrinsic evidence, Black’s Law Dictionary,
supra note 93 (defining extrinsic evidence as “[e]vidence relating to a contract but not appearing on
the face of the contract because it comes from other sources, such as statements between the parties
or the circumstances surrounding the agreement”).
235

236

Chin, supra note 110, at 109.

See, e.g., Ultra Res., Inc. v. Hartman, 2015 WY 40, ¶ 56, 346 P.3d 880, 889–900 (2015)
(“As we have stated before, even when a contract is unambiguous, evidence of the circumstances
surrounding its execution may be considered to determine the parties’ intent.”); Madison v. Marlatt,
237

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol19/iss1/7

24

Temte: Blockchain Challenges Traditional Contract Law: Just How Smart Ar

2019

Comment

111

of a coding mistake or breach, parties can choose to program dispute resolution
into the code.238 This would limit the need to resolve matters in court and could
help facilitate innovative responses in light of the complexity of a new market.239

and

V. Wyoming’s Blockchain Legislation
A Recommendation for Future Legislation

With blockchain technology emerging as a strong intermediary for trans
actional recordkeeping, the original idea behind smart contracts is modernizing
and developing into an entirely new area of transactional regulation.240 Wyoming
was among the first states to pass blockchain legislation.241 In the 2018 Budget
Session, the Legislature passed sweeping legislation embracing blockchain as
an engine of economic growth.242 The members of the Blockchain Task Force
(Task Force) proactively introduced legislation that impacts overall blockchain
technology and blockchain companies.243 The five new statutes
“(1) exempt utility blockchain tokens from state securities
laws; (2) exempt virtual currency from the state’s money
transmitter statute; (3) authorize corporate recordkeeping by
distributed or electronic records; (4) exempt virtual currency
from state property taxation; and (5) authorize ‘series’ LLC’s, a
corporate form considered especially conducive to blockchainrelated business.”244

619 P.2d 708, 714 (Wyo. 1980) (“However, when the terms of the contract are unclear on their face
and doubt arises from the contract itself as to what the parties mean, then extrinsic evidence becomes
admissible in order to establish the parties’ original intent and thus aid the court in construing the
contract accordingly.”).
238

Catchlove, supra note 166, at 15.

See Chin, supra note 110, 115 (explaining how smart contract dispute resolution could
mirror strategies adopted by the derivatives industry, a sector with significant and complex disputes,
similar to that expected in the blockchain industry).
239

240

See O’Shields, supra note 70, at 184– 85.

See Wyo. Stat. Ann §§ 17-4-206, 17-16-140 to -142, -626, -720, -724, -730, -1601,
17-29-21, 39-11-105, 40-22-102 to 110 (2018).
241

242

Lyle et al., supra note 6, at 185.

UW, State Blockchain Efforts Boosted by Technology Pioneer, Univ. Wyo. (June 5, 2018),
http://www.uwyo.edu/uw/news/2018/06/uw,-state-blockchain-efforts-boosted-by-technologypioneer.html (“The new legislation will allow Wyoming to be the first U.S. state and one of the
only places in the world to create a legally distinct asset class for blockchain, and positions the state
to be a leader in the blockchain sector.”) “Lawmakers have touted Wyoming as an ideal place for
blockchain, given Wyoming’s need for economic diversification.” Id.
243

244
Lyle et al., supra note 6, at 185. For a more in-depth look into the legislation passed, see
Eden L. Rohrer et al., Understanding the Effect of Wyoming’s Blockchain and Cryptocurrency
Legislation, K&L G ates ( June 4, 2018), http://www.klgates.com/understanding-theeffect-of-wyomings-blockchain-and-cryptocurrency-legislation-06-04-2018/.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2019

25

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 19 [2019], No. 1, Art. 7

112

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 19

This legislation shows Wyoming’s willingness to fully embrace blockchain.245
Moving forward, the Legislature and the Task Force are discussing potential
legislative proposals.246 One proposal defines smart contracts and addresses the
legal recognition of smart contracts.247
The Task Force was considering a new bill pertaining to smart contracts
for the upcoming session.248 The draft of the bill defined smart contracts as
automated transactions “comprised of code or programming language that executes
the terms of the contract, which may include taking custody or transferring
assets, or issuing legally executable instructions for these actions, based on the
occurrence or non-occurrence of specified conditions” that are carried out on
the blockchain.249
Besides defining smart contracts, the proposed bill addressed how the
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act would apply to blockchain technology.250
The proposed bill also uniquely proposed a resolution plan requirement for smart

245

See Lyle et al., supra note 6, at 185.

Chrissy Suttles & Katie Kull, Wyoming Blockchain Task Force to Introduce 2019 Legislation, Wyo. Trib. Eagle (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.wyomingnews.com/news/local_news/
wyoming-blockchain-task-force-to-introduce-legislation/article_9b281856-c2e4-11e8-bc633fc89e873cf2.html.
246

247
See Working Draft Version 5, 19LSO-0049, supra note 15. Wyoming would not be the
first state to legally recognize or define smart contracts. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-7061 (2018);
Tenn. Code. Ann. § 47-10-202 (2018); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 4173 (2018); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§§ 719.090, .250 (2017); Gayle M. Hyman & Matthew P. Digesti, New Nevada Legislation
Recognizes Blockchain and Smart Contract Technologies, Nev. Law., August 2017, at 13–17.
248
See Working Draft Version 5, 19LSO-0049, supra note 15; Blockchain Task Force
September Meeting Agenda, 64th Leg., Joint Interim Comm., at 2, https://www.wyoleg.gov/
InterimCommittee/2018/S3-20180924AgendaPreview.pdf (last updated Sept. 24, 2018).
249
See Working Draft Version 5, 19LSO-0049, supra note 15, at § 40-28-101(a)(iv)(A)–(C).
There was some commentary on the Bill about whether subparagraph (C) was limiting in that it
“ties smart contracts to blockchain technology and may not account for future innovations.” Id. The
draft also mentioned subparagraph (B) was generally borrowed from Tennessee’s legislation. Id.
250

See id. sec. 1. “The legislature finds the following: . . . .”
(iv) The existing standards of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, W.S.
40-21-101 through 40-21-119, are wide-ranging and likely already govern
blockchain-based transactions, including smart contracts;
(v) The provisions of this act provide legal certainty for parties who transact
business through smart contracts, underscoring the enforceability of smart
contracts and ensuring that smart contracts above a certain monetary threshold
contain a resolution plan memorializing the intent of the parties in the event of
specified contingencies or emergencies . . . .

Id.
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contracts with values exceeding a certain threshold amount.251 The legislative staff
comment about the required resolution plan provides a substantive summary of
the proposed sections:
Subsections (b) and (c) of this section state that a smart contract
which exceeds a specified value threshold must have some kind
of resolution plan which addresses one or more of the factors
above. The Task Force requested that it not be prescriptive, but
that it ensure that the parties to a smart contract have thought
somewhat about how they want the contract resolved in an
emergency, without having to obtain judicial relief to terminate
the smart contract. Smart contracts can perform contractual
duties without human direction, and as a result, lengthy judicial
resolution can be inefficient, complicated and costly because of
the need to unwind the smart contract. This section is meant
as a “living will” to avoid the need for judicial resolution or to
simplify a judge’s task dramatically by memorializing the intent
of the parties regarding emergency situations, i.e., facilitating a
quick temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.252
During discussion between members of the Task Force and the public,
the complexities of smart contracts’ regulation remained apparent.253 Some
commentators questioned the need to regulate smart contracts at all, while
others begged for clearer and more comprehensive language.254 The discussion
about smart contracts, combined with the public commentary, revealed many
unanswered questions and the need for more work before moving forward with
the proposed legislation.255
Different states’ laws and regulations are creating a patchwork in the block
chain landscape.256 For some commentators, current smart contract legislation

251
See id. § 40-28-102 (“Required Resolution Plan for Specified Smart Contracts; Characteristics”).

See Working Draft Version 3, Act Relating to Smart Contracts, S.F., 65th Leg., Gen. Sess.
(Wyo. 2019) (Blockchain Task Force Interim Committee Working Draft, 19LSO-0049) (available
with author).
252

253
See September 24 AM Audio 2: Blockchain Task Force Meeting, at 2:27:43 (2018), https://
www.wyoleg.gov/InterimCommittee/2018/Blockchain%20Sept%2024%20AM-2.mp3.
254

See id. at 2:27:52, 2:39:37.

255

See id.

See Lyle et al., supra note 6, at 187–202; Carla Reyes, Moving Beyond Bitcoin to
an Endogenous Theory of Decentralized Ledger Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal, 61
Vill. L. Rev. 191, 211 (2016) (explaining how regulatory bodies like courts and legislators “have
acted independently resulting in a regulatory mishmash of guidance, clarification, extension and
ongoing discussion”).
256
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falls short for its failure to adequately define important terms like “contract” and
“executed.”257 Wyoming should learn from this failure, and carefully define and
draft legislation to reduce ambiguity. At the same time, the Legislature should
resist comprehensively regulating smart contracts until the industry standards are
clear and courts have addressed the many uncertainties.258
Commentators agree that nothing in Wyoming’s current legislation
would prohibit the use of smart contracts.259 For this reason, the Legislature
should declare a legislative finding that the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
already permits the use of legally enforceable smart contracts.260 This finding
will demonstrate Wyoming’s hospitality to the use of smart contracts and avert
the Legislature from enacting specific regulations that inadvertently use limiting
language.261 This finding will also provide the judiciary with enough guidance
to enforce the use of smart contracts that adhere to traditional contractual
principles and decline to enforce those that do not adhere to such principles
until further regulation allows for them.262
After the Legislature passes a legislative finding, it should work closely
with the Blockchain Coalition and the Task Force to observe standards in the
smart contracts industry to help craft future legislation.263 These groups should
monitor existing smart contracts legislation to see how courts adjudicate smart
contracts in other states.264 These observations will certify that the Legislature
Mike Orcutt, States That Are Passing Laws to Govern “Smart Contracts” Have No Idea What
They’re Doing, MIT Tech. Rev. (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610718/
states-that-are-passing-laws-to-govern-smart-contracts-have-no-idea-what-theyre-doing/
(commenting on how the Tennessee definition of smart contracts was limiting because it only
provided for smart contracts using blockchain technology); see also September 24 AM Audio 2:
Blockchain Task Force Meeting, supra note 253, at 2:55:30 (commenting on how smart contracts
should be defined in a statute to avoid the danger of being classified as clickbait contracts, where
users agree to terms that often include questionable enforceability).
257

258

See supra notes 36, 101, 151, 230 and accompanying text.

259

See September 24 AM Audio 2: Blockchain Task Force Meeting, supra note 253, at 2:13:43.

This legislative finding would benefit from similar language as used in Working Draft
Version 5, 19LSO-0049, sec. 1, supra note 15. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
260

261
See supra note 257 and accompanying text (illustrating how easily it is for the Legislature to
enact limiting language when they draft bills to conform with a specific technology).
262

See supra notes 179– 80, 186 and accompanying text.

See generally Digital Asset Trade Assoc., https://digitalasset.org (last visited Nov. 18,
2018) (showing how The Digital Asset Trade Association is the leading advocacy group that sets
policy considerations for the industry, including smart contracts and digital currency); Shlomit
Azgad-Tromer, Crypto Securities: On the Risks of Investments in Blockchain-Based Assets and the
Dilemmas of Securities Regulation, 68 Am. U.L. Rev. 69, 133–34 (2018) (“The facts provided to the
court in any single particular case would rarely suffice to resolve a blockchain litigated case. Norms
and industry standards require broader understanding of the unique and almost peculiar dynamics
of the crypto markets.”); see also supra note 258 and accompanying text.
263

264

See supra note 247.
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only passes regulations that adhere to such standards and serve to bring capital
to Wyoming.265 This prudent monitoring of standards will also preclude the
Legislature from passing hasty legislation solely in response to the actions of
other states.266
Though the resolution requirement plan proposed in the working draft is
distinctive, the Legislature should pause on enacting such legislation until the
industry decides further standards.267 The reality is, “[i]t is too early to say how
smart contracts should be understood by the law and how, if at all, they should be
regulated.”268 Legislative provisions so exclusive to Wyoming, like the resolution
requirement plan, may bear unintended hindrances in the use and execution of
smart contracts, which would arguably deter blockchain companies.269
In some instances, existing rules can apply to the use of smart contracts, but
in other instances, policymakers will need to adapt the rules to the new context
of smart contract transactions.270 Smart contracts that operate in the traditional
contractual framework, which necessitates offer, acceptance, and consideration,
are likely not worth regulating.271 But more broadly, smart contracts will pilot legal
issues that courts and legislatures must address to provide a framework for parties
interested in using them.272 Legislators and Task Force members should consider
new regulatory techniques, like using code as the legal regulatory scheme of smart
contracts, asking the judiciary to recognize a new exception for smart contract
coders to prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and considering decisions that

265

See supra note 50.

See, e.g., Adrianne Jeffries, Blockchain Laws Tend to be Hasty, Unnecessary, and Extremely
Thirsty, Verge (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/29/17176596/blockchainbitcoin-cryptocurrency-state-law-legislation (“Most laws have definitions for terms like ‘blockchain’
and ‘smart contract,’ and those definitions could end up causing problems in the future . . . , if some
future iteration of a blockchain or a smart contract doesn’t strictly meet the definition set out in the
law.”); see also supra notes 247, 256 and accompanying text.
266

267

See Kolber, supra note 42, at 226–30.

Id. at 226; Azgad-Tromer, supra note 263, at 137 (explaining how certain groups of
regulators, scholars, judges, and industry players have not fully grasped blockchain technology or
the best way to regulate it; rather, there is an absence of structural analysis at this time, a necessity
for establishing laws to govern blockchain and its emerging markets).
268

269
Lyle et al., supra note 6, at 187 (explaining how uniformity brings higher cost of compliance
for blockchain companies doing business in more than one state).

See Maya Chilaeva & Pia Dutton, Smart Contracts: Can They be Aligned with Traditional
Principles or are Bespoke Norms Necessary?, 8 J. Int’l Banking & Fin. L. 479 (2018).
270

271

See supra notes 150 – 87 and accompanying text.

272

See supra notes 150 –239 and accompanying text.
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specialized courts make when adjudicating smart contract disputes.273 Because
smart contracts are such an innovative mechanism, blockchain companies
planning to utilize smart contract technology would better receive regulation
that echoes advancement in modernization.274 Policymakers should encourage
regulations designed to mitigate risk, but should exercise thoughtfulness and
accuracy in creating the scope of regulation.275 This thoughtfulness in enacting
smart contracts legislation should motivate smart contract developers to work
with the legal landscape instead of against it.276

VI. Conclusion
Blockchain and smart contracts are distinctive, multifaceted technologies
that generate much-needed innovation in states such as Wyoming.277 Because
Wyoming has such an inherent capability to attract blockchain companies,
it should recognize the importance of creating an amicable environment for
them.278 Smart contracts have evolved remarkably over time, beginning as simple
computer verification processes and progressing into sophisticated, self-executing
programs with potential to transform industries as a result of blockchain
technology.279 Smart contracts possess several advantages, providing for more
efficient business operations, aiding transactional transparency, and yielding
less risk of breach.280 Alongside their advantages, smart contracts pose various
limitations, including uncontrollability, inflexibility, and overall uncertainty.281
Aside from general concerns, smart contracts have raised a myriad of legal
issues that courts and legislatures must eventually address.282 Courts and
legislatures have hesitated to determine the legal enforceability of smart contracts
under traditional contract law principles.283 Smart contract coders could

See supra notes 180, 203, 225 and accompanying text. Though it is unlikely Wyoming
will be home to such specialized courts due to an overall absence of specialized courts within the
state, Wyoming can still look to other states’ specialized courts when considering how to adjudicate such claims.
273

274
See Elizabeth S. Ross, Comment, Nobody Puts Blockchain in a Corner: The Disruptive Role
of Blockchain Technology in the Financial Services Industry and Current Regulatory Issues, 25 Cath.
U.J.L. & Tech 353, 374 –76, 380 –81 (2017) (“[O]verly broad regulations and vague administrative
guidance that do not directly address blockchain technology stifle innovation. . . .”).
275

Kiviat, supra note 150, at 607.

276

See Jaccard, supra note 221, at 25.

277

See supra notes 38–56 and accompanying text.

278

See supra notes 6–9, 38–47 and accompanying text.

279
280

See supra notes 57–89 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 90–95 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 96–125 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 150 –239 and accompanying text.

283

See supra notes 150–87 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol19/iss1/7

30

Temte: Blockchain Challenges Traditional Contract Law: Just How Smart Ar

2019

Comment

117

potentially practice law without a license simply by way of writing smart contract
code.284 Users feel uncertain about which law governs the smart contract due to
the ambiguous choice of law provisions as they apply to electronic agreements.285
Authorities have yet to clarify the liability of parties when a coder mis-codes a
smart contract or when a smart contract executes according to mistaken terms.286
Wyoming is embarking on a sophisticated regulatory path that requires
thoughtful consideration and innovation.287 Due to blockchain’s highly complex
nature, Wyoming should avoid hurriedly passing smart contract legislation until
it realizes the bulk effects of other states’ smart contracts legislation.288 Rather, the
Legislature should pass a legislative finding, confirming that the state’s existing
laws are conducive to the use of smart contract technology.289 Wyoming should
enact further legislation that follows the trajectory of the industry standards as they
become clearer.290 Innovative regulations will demonstrate Wyoming’s eagerness
to appeal to smart contract users, which will in turn stimulate the economy,
revolutionize current industries, and expand new industries within the state.291
As noted by one blockchain-sector advisor, state-by-state regulation of blockchain
technology is “a relay race, not a sprint,” and more achievable innovation occurs
as one state takes the baton from another.292
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See supra notes 188–208 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 209–25 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 226–39 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 256 –58, 274 –76 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 262, 264–66 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 260–62 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 258–69 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 274–76 and accompanying text.

Gary Miller, Blockchain Valley: Wyoming is Poised to Become the Cryptocurrency Capital of
America, Newsweek (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.newsweek.com/wyoming-cowboy-state-poisedtoday-become-blockchain-valley-828124 (quoting former director of the Delaware blockchain
initiative, Andrea Tinianow).
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